Northern Illinois University

Huskie Commons
Northern Illinois Law Review Supplement

College of Law

5-1-2012

Vol. 3 No. 2, Spring 2012; Illinois Supreme Court: Overturn
Thompson v. Gordon and Protect Design Professionals from
Unbargained-For, Extra-Contractual Obligations
Daniel Nunney

Follow this and additional works at: https://huskiecommons.lib.niu.edu/niulr_sup
Part of the Law Commons

Original Citation
Daniel Nunney, Note, Illinois Supreme Court: Overturn Thompson v. Gordon and Protect Design
Professionals from Unbargained-For, Extra-Contractual Obligations, 3 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. Online Supp. 95
(2012).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Huskie Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Northern Illinois Law Review Supplement by an authorized administrator of Huskie
Commons. For more information, please contact jschumacher@niu.edu.

Illinois Supreme Court: Overturn Thompson
v. Gordon and Protect Design Professionals
from Unbargained-For, Extra-Contractual
Obligations
I.
II.

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 95
BACKGROUND .................................................................................... 97
A.
DESIGN PROFESSIONALS & CONTRACT INTERPRETATION .............. 97

THE FERENTCHAK DECISION AND HOW THE SCOPE OF A DESIGN
PROFESSIONAL’S DUTY IS LIMITED BY THE CONTRACT .................. 99
C.
HUNT AND BILLMAN: HOW ILLINOIS DISTINGUISHES BETWEEN
DESIGN PROFESSIONALS AND INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS ..... 101
FACTS OF THOMPSON V . GORDON ................................................... 102
ANALYSIS ......................................................................................... 104
A.
REPORT ........................................................................................................ 104
B.

III.
IV.

1.
2.

Contract Interpretation ..................................................... 105
Precedential Evaluation.................................................... 107
B. ANALYSIS ........................................................................................................ 110
1. Contract Interpretation Gone Bad.................................... 110
2. The Ferentchak Precedent and the Scope of Design
Professionals’ Contractual Duties............................................ 112
3. Design Professional vs. Independent Contractor ............. 115
V. PRACTICAL IMPACTS AND POLICY CONCERNS ............................... 116
VI. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................... 118

I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine you are a professional engineer and you enter into a contract
with a developer to design a replacement for a simple light bulb switch in
the bathroom of a new house.1 You agree to design the replacement with
the degree of care and skill normally expected of a professional engineer.
You complete your assignment, the developer is satisfied with your work,
and you are adequately compensated. Twenty years later that house burns
down because of a faulty light bulb switch in the kitchen. The homeowner
subsequently sues you for negligence and claims that you did not analyze,
review, and redesign all of the switches in the house, including the one in
1. The hypothetical is loosely-based on a recent policy argument. See Thompson v.
Gordon, 923 N.E.2d 808, 825-829 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
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the kitchen, and thus you breached your duty as a professional engineer and
are liable for damages. Even though you only agreed to design the replacement switch in the bathroom, the Illinois Second District Court of Appeals
may likely have found that you owed a contractual duty to redesign the
kitchen switch based on the standard of care provision in the contract.2
This Note addresses the aforementioned hypothetical regarding how
Illinois courts conduct contract interpretation and define the scope of contractual duties for design professionals.3 It considers whether the Thompson
Court properly interpreted the contract as well as whether it correctly followed applicable Illinois precedent when defining the scope of contractual
duties for an engineer. It also advocates how the Illinois Supreme Court
should rule on this issue when it comes before the court.4 Finally, this Note
addresses the short and long-term practical impacts of the Thompson decision, and also addresses a number of policy considerations associated with
the majority’s ruling.
In Part II, this Note first looks at some background information with
respect to design professionals in general. It also details how Illinois courts
conduct contract interpretation. Next, this Note looks at how the Illinois
Supreme Court has defined the scope of design professionals’ contractual
duties as illustrated by Ferentchak v. Village of Frankfort.5 Finally, it contrasts design professionals’ contractual duties under negligent design claims
with independent contractors’ contractual duties under negligent construction claims as illustrated by both Hunt v. Balsius6 and Billman v. Frenzel
Construction Co.7 Part III examines the facts of Thompson and its nearly
twenty-year procedural history. 8 Part IV considers the arguments contemplated by both the majority and the dissent, and then analyzes how the Illinois Supreme Court should rule. Finally, Part V addresses the practical impacts of upholding or overturning the Thompson decision in addition to any
policy problems the ruling could create.
This Note argues that the Illinois Supreme Court should overturn the
Thompson decision. For reasons of honoring bargained-for contractual obligations, upholding established conventions of contract interpretation, reaf-

2. See id.
3. A “design professional” is a term used to describe professional architects and
engineers. See CONSTRUCTION ACCIDENT LITIGATION § 2.2 (2010).
4. After completion of this article, its central argument was in fact used by the
Illinois Supreme Court in overturning the Second District’s decision. See Thompson v. Gordon, 948 N.E.2d 39 (Ill. 2011).
5. Ferentchak v. Vill. of Frankfort, 475 N.E.2d 822, 825-26 (Ill. 1985).
6. Hunt v. Blasius, 384 N.E.2d 368, 371-72 (Ill. 1978).
7. Billman v. Frenzel Constr. Co., 635 N.E.2d 435, 437 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
8. Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 810-12.
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firming applicable Illinois precedent, fairness, and finally public policy; the
Illinois Supreme Court should reverse the Second District Court’s ruling.

II.
A.

BACKGROUND

DESIGN PROFESSIONALS & CONTRACT INTERPRETATION

Throughout history design professionals have been held liable for defective designs.9 One way design professionals can be held liable for defective designs is through a professional negligence claim, but when duties are
created by contract, liability for negligence necessarily depends on the contractual obligations.10 Moreover, liability can result from a breach of a contractual duty occurring during or after construction, as well as with or without structural failure.11 In some cases, design professionals decide to take
on many contractual duties, such as overseeing or supervising the construction phase, and thus, they will be subjected to increased liability.12 In other
cases, design professionals may want less cost and exposure to risk, and
therefore take on less contractual duties by only contracting to create the
9. See, e.g., W.E. Guillian, Liability of Architects & Engineers, 35 TENN. L. REV. 9
(Fall 1967) (discussing how the ancient society of Babylon dealt with defective construction
and design of buildings: The Code of Hammurabi provided that if a house collapsed and the
owner was killed, the architect would be put to death); see also, e.g., Miller v. De Witt, 208
N.E.2d 249, 255 (Ill. 1965) (finding that the architects breached their duty of care when
preparing the designs for a roof that collapsed and injured three people); Fox v. Stanley J.
How & Assocs., 309 N.W.2d 520, 527 (Iowa Ct. App. 1981) (involving a woman who ran
into a window at a hospital; the court found that the architectural firm breached a duty of
care to make its designs without defects); Montijo v. Swift, 219 Cal. App. 2d 351, 353 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1963) (involving a person who fell on the stairway of a bus depot; the court held
that the architect owed a duty to exercise ordinary care when designing the stairway by not
creating a dangerous condition).
10. Ferentchak, 475 N.E.2d at 825-26.
11. See, e.g., Evans v. Howard R. Green Co., 231 N.W.2d 907, 916 (Iowa 1975)
(involving construction of a pollution control plant where two construction workers were
killed by hydrogen sulfide gas because of an architectural and an engineering firm’s negligent design); Karna v. Byron Reed Syndicate No. 4, 374 F. Supp. 687, 690 (D. Neb. 1974)
(involving a guest who was injured after walking into a glass door upon completion of construction at a hotel; court held architect was not liable because the design was modified by
someone other than the architect); Sherman v. Miller Const. Co., 158 N.E. 255, 256 (Ind.
1927) (after construction of a school was completed, a child fell onto a concrete basement
because of a lack of a guard or railing; the architect was found not liable for negligent design
because the plans had been approved by the school trustee).
12. See, e.g., Gross v. Kenton Structural & Ornamental Ironworks, Inc., 581 F.
Supp. 390 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (holding that a design professional undertook supervisory role
and had a duty to prevent a stairway collapse that killed one person during construction);
Geer v. Bennett, 237 So. 2d 311, 314 (Fla. Ct. App. 1970) (finding a design professional
liable while acting in a supervisory role when a worker fell from the second floor of a building that had no guardrail).
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designs.13 Finally, in the majority of instances where courts find design
professionals liable for negligent design, the design professional generally
undertook some type of supervisory responsibility as opposed to merely
creating the designs.14
But why do design professionals enter into contracts in the first place?
Legal authorities have stated that contracting “enables parties to project
exchange into the future and to tailor their affairs according to their individual needs and interests . . . .”15 When design professionals form contractual relationships, it also allows them to allocate the risks as well as the
costs associated with bargaining.16 Because contracting parties bargain in
these terms, the main function of contract law is to protect the contracting
parties’ expectations by enforcing their bargained-for legal agreements.17
To protect contracting parties’ reasonable expectations, the court’s
main goal is to effectuate the intent of the parties through contract interpretation.18 The Illinois Supreme Court has found that the “plain and ordinary
meaning” of the contract language gives the best indication of intent.19 This
means that judges will look at the explicit contractual terms to determine
the intent of the parties.20
It is well settled that a court may not “interpret the agreement as meaning something different from what the parties intended as expressed by the
language they saw fit to employ.”21 In addition:
[T]he [judicial] interpretation or construction of a contract
does not include its modification or the creation of a new or
different agreement; a court is not at liberty to revise, modify, or distort an agreement while professing to construe it,
and has no right to make a different contract from that actually made by the parties.22
See CONSTRUCTION ACCIDENT LITIGATION § 2.7 (2010).
Id. § 2.5.
1 S AMUEL WILLISTON & R ICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 1:1 (4th ed. 1993 & Supp. 2010). Accord 17A AM . JUR . 2D Contracts § 1
(2010).
16. 17A AM . JUR . 2D Contracts § 1 (2010).
17. Id.
18. See Thompson v. Gordon, 923 N.E.2d 808, 813 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); Gallagher
v. Lenart, 874 N.E.2d 43, 58 (Ill. 2007).
19. Gallagher, 874 N.E.2d at 58.
20. Id.
21. 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 333 (2010).
22. 11 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 15, § 31:5. Accord Imperial Fire Ins. Co. of
London v. Coos Cnty., 151 U.S. 452, 456 (1894); City of New Orleans v. New Orleans
Waterworks Co., 142 U.S. 79, 88 (1891); Memphis & L.R.R. Co. v. So. Exp. Co., 117 U.S.
1, 6 (1886); Morgan Cnty. v. Allen, 103 U.S. 498, 510 (1880). Note:
13.
14.
15.
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Moreover, “[j]udges have no roving writ to construe the contract language
in the way that they think best.”23 Judges have a duty to protect bargainedfor legal agreements and abide by the intent of the parties even if they disagree with the outcome.24
To illustrate how the Illinois courts have protected bargained-for legal
agreements through contract interpretation, an examination of the Illinois
Supreme Court case Ferentchak v. The Village of Frankfort is appropriate.25
Specifically, Ferentchak is the precedent case in Illinois that defines how
courts are to determine the scope of design professionals’ contractual duties.26
B.

THE FERENTCHAK DECISION AND HOW THE SCOPE OF A DESIGN
PROFESSIONAL’S DUTY IS LIMITED BY THE CONTRACT

In Ferentchak, a licensed Illinois civil engineer contracted with a land
developer to design a subdivision’s surface water drainage system and to
observe its construction.27 After the engineer completed the designs and the
developer accepted them, the Village of Frankfort gave its approval to
begin construction.28 The builder then constructed a custom home and sold
it to the Ferentchaks.29 A few months later, water began to accumulate in
the backyard, and because the foundation grade elevation was set too low,
the basement subsequently flooded.30 As a result of the water damage, the
homeowners brought a negligence action against the engineer.31 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant’s failure to set foundation grade elevations

The notion, that free men and women may reach agreements regarding
their affairs without government interference and that courts will enforce
those agreements, is ancient and irrefutable. It draws strength from
common-law roots and can be seen in our fundamental charter, the United States Constitution, where government is forbidden from impairing
the contracts of citizens, art I, § 10, cl. 1.
Wilkie v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 664 N.W.2d 776 (Mich. 2003). Also note that, “[a]dditional
obligations or undertakings may not be imposed on a party to a contract under the guise or
authority of [judicial interpretation].” 11 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 15, § 31:6.
23. 11 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 15, § 31:5 (quoting Exxon Co. v. Esso
Workers’ Union, Inc., 118 F.3d 841, 844 (1st Cir. 1997)).
24. 11 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 15, § 31:5.
25. See Ferentchak v. Vill. of Frankfurt, 475 N.E.2d 822 (Ill. 1985).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 824.
30. Ferentchak, 475 N.E.2d at 824.
31. Id. at 823-24.The plaintiffs also sued the Village of Frankfort, the developer,
and the builder, but only the Illinois Supreme Court’s ruling with respect to the engineer is
pertinent to this Note. Id. at 824.
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in the drainage system plans caused their damages.32 The engineer maintained, however, that he was never asked by the developer to set the grade
elevations.33 Plaintiffs nevertheless claimed that a duty arose from the defendant’s professional responsibility as a civil engineer to exercise the degree of care and skill required of ordinary engineers in the community.34
Moreover, the plaintiffs’ expert testified that the defendant should have
included grade elevations in the plans, and because the specifications were
missing, plaintiffs argued that the defendant failed to exercise the degree of
care and skill required of an ordinary engineer.35
The supreme court disagreed with the plaintiffs and the lower courts36
and ruled in favor of the defendant.37 The court found that the scope of the
engineer’s duty was limited to what was specifically contained in the contractual agreement with the developer.38 Because the contract did not explicitly mention setting foundation grade levels, the court held that the engineer did not owe a duty to the plaintiffs, and consequently he could not
have deviated from the standard of care.39 The court felt that it would be
unreasonable to impose an extra-contractual duty of care on the engineer
without a previously bargained-for agreement.40 To support its holding, the
court added that the developer accepted the engineer’s work even though
foundation grade elevations for the lots were not included, reasoning that
had the engineer not met his contractual obligations, the developer would
32. Id. at 823-24.
33. Id. at 825. The court agreed, “The record indicate[d] that this contract did not
require [the engineer] to set the foundation grade levels for each lot.” Ferentchak, 475
N.E.2d at 823.
34. Id. at 826. Design professionals can be sued for professional negligence, but the
liability in tort originates in the obligations created through contract law. M. Wright & D.
Boelzner, Quantifying Liability Under the Architect’s Standard of Care, 29 U. RICH. L. REV.
1471, 1472 (1995). To bring a cause of action for negligence, the plaintiff must show that
the defendant had a duty to meet a certain standard of care, the standard was not met, and as
a result the defendant proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury. See, e.g., Town of Thornton
v. Winterhoff, 92 N.E.2d 163, 166 (Ill. 1950). But before the plaintiff has the opportunity to
prove the elements of breach, causation, or damages, it is first the job of the trial court to
determine whether the defendant owed a legal duty to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Barnes v.
Washington, 305 N.E.2d 535, 538 (Ill. 1973). If the court finds that no legal duty is owed,
there can be no liability whether the cause of action is for negligence or breach of contract.
Id. This same approach applies when a court determines whether a design professional owes
a contractual duty under a negligent design cause of action. See, e.g., Ferentchak, 475
N.E.2d at 825.
35. Ferentchak, 475 N.E.2d at 825.
36. At trial, the jury found that the engineer was liable for negligence, and on appeal
the Third District affirmed the judgment against the engineer. Id. at 824.
37. Id. at 825-26.
38. Id.
39. See id.
40. Ferentchak, 475 N.E.2d at 825-26.
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not have accepted the designs.41 Furthermore, the court highlighted the fact
that the engineer did not know what types of custom houses were going to
be built on the lots and as a result, the engineer had inadequate information
to set the foundation elevations accurately, and therefore his reliance on
others to set the foundation levels was proper.42
The Ferentchak court also opined that its holding was limited to determining the scope of contractual duties for engineers creating designs
under negligent design claims, and not independent contractors following
designs under negligent construction claims.43 To contrast the Illinois Supreme Court’s stance on determining design professionals’ contractual duties, Hunt v. Balsius demonstrates the court’s stance when determining independent contractors’ duties of care.44
C.

HUNT AND BILLMAN: HOW ILLINOIS DISTINGUISHES BETWEEN DESIGN
PROFESSIONALS AND INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS

In Hunt, a car collided with a highway construction sign.45 The impact
killed two passengers and badly injured three others.46 The plaintiffs sued
the independent contractor for negligent construction and alleged that he
failed to exercise reasonable care while designing and installing the exit
sign.47 The Illinois Supreme Court found that “[a]n independent contractor
owes no duty to third persons to judge the plans, specifications or instructions which he has merely contracted to follow.”48 In addition, the court
found that an independent contractor will only owe a duty to third persons
if the specifications “are so obviously dangerous that no competent contractor would follow them.”49 Because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that
the designs were “so obviously dangerous” that the independent contractor
should not have followed them, the court held that the defendant owed no
duty to the plaintiffs on the negligent construction claim, and affirmed the
summary judgment for the defendants.50
Another Illinois case that examined an independent contractor’s duty
of care is Billman v. Frenzel Construction Co. from the Illinois First District Appellate Court.51 In Billman, a car crossed over the median of a newly
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

See id. at 826.
Id.
Id.at 825.
Hunt v. Blasius, 384 N.E.2d 368, 371-72 (Ill. 1978).
Id. at 369.
Id.
Id. at 371.
Hunt, 384 N.E.2d at 371.
Id.
Id. at 371-72.
See Billman v. Frenzel Constr. Co., 635 N.E.2d 435 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
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widened road and crashed into another car.52 The impact rendered one of
the passengers comatose.53 The plaintiffs sued the independent contractor
for negligent construction. They alleged that the median was too short to
prevent the accident and that the defendant had a duty not to follow such
obviously dangerous designs.54 As evidentiary support, the plaintiffs submitted an affidavit from an expert engineer who contended that the defendant should have known that the designs he relied on were dangerous.55 The
First District Appellate Court held that because construction of the median
was within the contractor’s duty, the plaintiff’s affidavit created “a material
question of fact as to whether [the independent contractor] breached [the]
duty it owed to [the plaintiff].”56 The court also noted, like the Illinois Supreme Court in Ferentchak, that there is a distinction between an independent contractor who follows plans under a negligent construction claim such
as in Hunt, and an engineer who creates designs under a negligent design
claim as in Ferentchak.57
The Illinois Supreme Court’s stance on limiting the scope of engineers’ contractual duties under the Ferentchak precedent has been the
benchmark case for the past twenty-five years.58 Just recently the Illinois
Second District Appellate Court’s majority and dissenting opinions in
Thompson v. Gordon fiercely and directly addressed the “essence”59 of
Ferentchaks’ precedential scope regarding the extent of contractual duties
for engineers.

III.

FACTS OF THOMPSON V. GORDON

In January 1991, two engineering companies entered into a contract
with a developer to design a replacement for a bridge deck on Chicago’s I94/Grand Avenue interchange.60 The engineers agreed to perform their task
52. Id. at 436.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 437.
56. Billman, 635 N.E.2d at 439.
57. See Billman, 635 N.E.2d at 438. When referring to the engineers’ duties for
their designs in Ferentchak, the court stated, “It is not clear that the same rule should apply
to a contractor governed by the Hunt decision.” Id. The court however did not have to answer this question because constructing the median fell within the scope of the independent
contractor’s contractual duties. Id.
58. Thompson v. Gordon, 923 N.E.2d 808, 820-21 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
(Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
59. See Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 817-829.
60. Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 810-11. The contract language for the bridge deck
replacement stated, “[f]inal structural design plans will be provided for deck replacement of
the existing Grand Avenue bridge over I-94.” Id. at 811. The engineers also contracted to
design a roadway interchange, which included redesigning a ramp from one to two lanes,
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with the degree of care and skill normally expected of professional engineers.61 Their proposed plans for the deck replacement included a median
barrier that was approximately four feet wide and roughly seven inches
tall.62 The developer and the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT)
accepted the plans and used them to construct the bridge deck.63
In November 1998, Trevor Thompson and his daughter, Amber, were
traveling west on Grand Avenue.64 Another driver, Christie Gordon, was
simultaneously traveling eastbound when she lost control of her vehicle. 65
Her car crashed into the median barrier, vaulted into the air, and collided
with the Thompsons’ vehicle.66 The impact killed both Amber and Trevor
Thompson.67 As a result, Corinne Thompson, both individually and on behalf of the estates of her husband and daughter, brought suit against the
engineers.68 The plaintiff alleged that the defendants negligently designed
the bridge deck and that it caused the crash that killed her husband and
daughter.69
The plaintiff supported her claim with an affidavit from an expert civil
engineer70 who opined that the defendants did not meet their standard of
care when they designed the bridge deck replacement.71 The expert believed
that the defendants would have met their standard of care had they designed
widening a lane, providing a roadway lighting design, and a number of other tasks. However, these contractual obligations were not the subject matter on appeal. Id.
61. Id. The contract language for the duty of care stated, “The standard of care
applicable to [defendants’] services will be the degree of skill and diligence normally employed by professional engineers or consultants performing the same or similar services.
[Defendants] will reperform any services not meeting this standard without additional compensation.” Id. at 820.
62. Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 811. The court noted that the median had previously
been four feet wide and roughly six inches tall. Id.
63. See Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 811.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 810. The plaintiff sued several other defendants that
were not parties to this appeal: the driver and developer, among others. See id. at n.2. The
plaintiff however could not sue the IDOT because “a suit against the Illinois Department of
Transportation is considered to be a suit against the State itself,” Magna Trust Co. v. Dep’t
of Transp., Div. of Water Resources, 600 N.E.2d 1317, 1319 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992), and “the
State of Illinois shall not be made a defendant or party in any court,” 745 ILL. COMP. S TAT.
5/1 (2008).
69. See Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 811.
70. The fact that the expert was not a licensed engineer in Illinois but was eligible to
give expert engineering testimony was highly contested in this case. See Thompson v. Gordon, 813 N.E.2d 241 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004), vacated & remanded by Thompson v. Gordon, 817
N.E.2d 894 (Ill. 2004); Thompson v. Gordon 827 N.E.2d 983 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005), aff’d,
Thompson v. Gordon, 851 N.E.2d 1231 (Ill. 2006).
71. Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 811-12.
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an improved median barrier that likely would have prevented the car from
becoming airborne.72 The trial court nevertheless granted summary judgment for the defendants because the contract did not specifically provide a
duty to review or to design an improved median barrier.73 Further, the trial
court ruled that the contractual agreement only required the defendants to
design a replacement median without changing the previously existing design.74

IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

REPORT

The plaintiff appealed the trial court’s decision to the Illinois Second
District.75 On appeal, the appellate court reversed the summary judgment
ruling by holding that the engineers had a duty to replace the median “exactly as it already existed,” as well as had a duty to investigate and design
an improved median barrier.76 Further, the court relied upon an expert’s
affidavit to show that there was a factual question that still needed to be
answered in order to determine whether the engineers breached their duty
of care, and therefore the court remanded the case to the trial court.77 In
making its ruling, the court first had to determine the intent of the parties. 78
To do this, the court interpreted the contract by finding the “plain and ordinary meaning” of the standard of care provision as well as the term “replacement.”79 Based on the contract interpretation, the court was able to
rule as a matter of law whether, and to what extent, the defendants owed a
duty of care.80 Finally, the court examined Illinois precedent by distinguishing the Ferentchak case and analogizing the Billman decision in support of
its holding.81

72. Id. The expert found that defendants also did not consider traffic capacities,
weave lane failures, and other important information that would have been instrumental in
creating an improved median barrier. Id. at 812.
73. Id. at 812.
74. Id.
75. Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 810.
76. Id. at 813-16.
77. Id. at 814-15.
78. Id. at 813.
79. Id. at 813-14.
80. Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 814-15.
81. Id. at 816-18.
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Contract Interpretation

To determine whether the defendants owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, the court must first, as a matter of law, interpret the language of the
defendants’ contract.82 When interpreting the contract, the court’s main
objective is to effectuate the intent of the contracting parties, and the “plain
and ordinary meaning” of the contract language gives the court the best
indication of intent.83
The Second District found the plain language of the term “replacement”84 in defendants’ contract to mean that defendants “would submit
plans to rebuild the bridge deck (and accompanying median) exactly as it
already existed.”85 Given this interpretation, the court found that the defendants owed a duty of care to design the replacement median barrier exactly as it once was.86 The court next interpreted the standard of care provision in the contract and found that it imposed an additional “professional
duty of care on defendants’ work” when designing the median.87 The
Thompson majority determined that the additional duty, borne out of the
standard of care provision, entailed that the defendants investigate and design an improved median barrier. The dissenting justice agreed with the
Thompson majority’s interpretation of the term “replacement,” but strongly
disagreed with the court’s interpretation of the standard of care provision.88
82. Id. at 813; Gallagher v. Lenart, 874 N.E.2d 43, 58 (Ill. 2007).
83. Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 813.
84. See id. at 813. The court found that “[t]he word ‘replacement’ has a wellunderstood meaning. Webster defines the word ‘replace’ as meaning to place again; to restore to a former condition.” Id. (quoting Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Franklin Cnty., 56
N.E.2d 775, 779 (Ill. 1944)). In addition, the court stated in Gallagher that “[b]ecause words
derive part of their meaning from the context in which they are used, a court construing a
contract must look at the contract as a whole, by viewing each part . . . in light of the others.”
Gallagher, 847 N.E.2d at 58. To find the “plain and ordinary meaning” the court contrasted
the word “replacement” in one part of the contract with the word “improvements” in another. Id. “An improvement is ‘[a] valuable addition made to property . . . or an amelioration in
its condition, amounting to more than mere repairs or replacement.’” Thompson, 923 N.E.2d
at 813 (quoting Bank of Ravenswood v. City of Chicago, 717 N.E.2d 478, 483 (Ill. App. Ct.
1999).
85. Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 814 (emphasis added).
86. See id. at 814, 820-21 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 815 (majority opinion).
88. See id. at 820-21 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting). The interpretation of the standard
of care provision was the most controversial issue on appeal. Id. at 820. In her dissent, Justice Hutchinson stated,
[I]n what appears to be a strained effort to reach a predetermined result,
the majority disregards its own interpretation of the contractual tasks to
be performed by defendants and holds that defendants also had an obligation to perform the task of redesigning the bridge deck and median to
include a Jersey barrier.
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According to Justice Hutchinson’s dissent, “[t]he plain language of
[the standard of care]89 provision expressly limited the standard of care to
‘[defendants’] services.’”90 Justice Hutchinson found the standard of care
provision applied to the bargained-for contractual services of designing a
“replacement,” and did not create an entirely separate professional duty of
care.91 The dissent therefore determined that the defendants had a duty only
to replace the median barrier “exactly as it already existed” with the degree
of care expected of professional engineers.92 Justice Hutchinson felt that the
majority completely overlooked the intent of the contracting parties in its
ruling.93 She supported her conclusion by pointing to the importance of the
conduct of the contracting parties: if the developer had wanted a “jersey
barrier,” he would have negotiated for an “improved” median and not requested a “replacement”;94 and if the engineers had not performed their task
within the proper standard of care, the developer would have had them redo
the plans.95 The majority, however, did not address the dissent’s reasoning
with respect to the conduct of the parties as evidence of intent.96 Finally,
Justice Hutchinson believed that the effect of the court’s ruling was to force
the engineers to perform a task nearly twenty years after the parties signed
Id. Justice Hutchinson also stated,
[I]n an illogical perversion of contract interpretation, after acknowledging that the only bridge-deck-related task was to provide a design to replace it, the majority avails itself of the contract’s standard-of-care provision to rewrite defendants’ contract to require an unbargained-for task
to redesign the bridge deck to include a Jersey barrier even though the
existing bridge deck did not already have one.
Id.
89. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
90. Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 820 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 821.
92. Id. at 814 (majority opinion); Id. at 825 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 824 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that “from a practical
perspective, the majority’s decision is unworkable and renders the true intent of the contracting parties meaningless.” Id.
94. See Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 821 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting); see also Lee v.
Allstate Life Ins. Co., 838 N.E.2d 15, 24 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (stating that there is a presumption “‘against provisions that easily could have been included in the contract but were not.”’
(quoting Klemp v. Hergott Group, Inc., 641 N.E.2d 957, 962 (Ill. 1994))).
95. Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 821 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting). The dissent noted
that the record did not indicate that the developer asked the engineers to redo any contracted
obligations. Id. To bolster the dissent’s position, the court referenced the following: “[A]
court cannot alter, change or modify the existing terms of a contract or add new terms or
conditions to which the parties do not appear to have assented, write into the contract something which the parties have omitted or take away something which the parties have included.” Gallagher v. Lenart, 854 N.E.2d 800, 807 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
96. Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 810-19 (majority opinion); Id. at 825-27 (Hutchinson,
J., dissenting).
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the agreement that was completely unbargained-for and outside the scope of
the contract.97
The duty issue was further debated in a supplemental opinion, but still,
the majority determined that the standard of care provision imposed a duty
on the defendants to investigate and design an improved median barrier.98
As a result, the court next moved to the issue of whether or not the engineers’ duty of care was breached.99 The court found that the expert engineer’s affidavit provided enough evidentiary support for the plaintiff’s argument that the engineers had breached their professional standard of care
by not investigating or designing an improved median barrier.100
2.

Precedential Evaluation

After the court interpreted the contract language and found that the defendants owed the plaintiff multiple duties of care, it next examined Illinois
precedent.101 The bulk of the court’s precedential analysis looked at
Ferentchak v. Village of Frankfort102 and its application to Thompson.103
First, the Thompson majority reasoned that the Ferentchak court did not
create a duty of care to set foundation grade elevations in that case because
that engineer’s contract only involved designing the drainage system and
not setting foundation levels.104 Second, because another party was going to
build custom homes on the individual lots, the Thompson court reasoned
that the Ferentchak engineer did not have enough information to give any
relevant input regarding the foundation levels, and thus, it was impossible
for him to get involved.105 Given this interpretation, the majority read the
“essence” of Ferentchak to be “that the engineer . . . had no knowledge
about the defective design and no involvement in creating it,” and therefore
no duty of care was imposed.106 The Thompson defendants, on the other
hand, contended that the Ferentchak precedent stood for prohibiting the
imposition of a duty when a contract did not explicitly mention it; however,
the court rejected the defendants’ Ferentchak interpretation.107

97. See id. at 824-25 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 825-27.
99. Id. at 814-15 (majority opinion).
100. Id. at 815.
101. Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 816-17 (majority opinion).
102. See supra Part II.A (explaining the facts of the case and the court’s holding); see
also Ferentchak v. Vill. of Frankfurt, 475 N.E.2d 822 (Ill. 1985).
103. See Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 816-17 (majority opinion).
104. Id. at 817.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. The majority stated, “We do not read Ferentchak so broadly.” Id.
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The Thompson court next attempted to support its finding by distinguishing Ferentchak.108 The majority stated that the Thompson engineers,
unlike the Ferentchak engineer, “were charged with designing precisely the
object (the median barrier) that plaintiff claim[ed] was defective.”109 Also,
the majority noted that the Thompson engineers, unlike the Ferentchak engineer, had complete information regarding the purportedly defective median design.110 The court reasoned that because the Thompson engineers were
involved in creating the median design and had knowledge of its allegedly
defective nature, they “had a duty to go beyond the specifically mentioned
task of replacing the bridge deck” by considering or designing an improved
median “even though the improved median barrier was not explicitly mentioned in the contract.”111 The majority emphasized that its holding did not
violate Ferentchak; however, the dissenting justice emphatically disagreed.112
Justice Hutchinson found that the majority’s reading of the Ferentchak
holding was too restrictive.113 In her view, the Illinois Supreme Court in
Ferentchak did not create a duty to set foundation levels not because that
engineer had inadequate information or involvement to complete an extracontractual task, but because the “engineer’s duty [was] dependent only on
his contractual obligations” and setting foundation levels was not specifically mentioned in the contract.114 Justice Hutchinson believed that the
Ferentchak court merely mentioned the engineer’s lack of information as
evidence in support of its conclusion, not as the “essence” of its holding. 115
The dissenting justice then gave her reading of the “essence” of Ferentchak
by stating the following:
When addressing the question of whether, pursuant to his
responsibility as a professional engineer, the engineer had a
duty to set foundation levels despite the absence of a contractual obligation to do so, our supreme court unequivo108. See Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 817 (majority opinion).
109. Id.
110. See id.
111. Id.
112. See id. at 822 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting). The dissent stated, “the majority’s
opinion intentionally disregards relevant and binding authority . . . while employing its own
perverted version of the law.” Id. at 822-23. Justice Hutchinson also stated that “[n]ot surprisingly, by focusing on the ‘essence’ of the Ferentchak decision, the majority overlooks
the actual holding in the case,” and further stated that “the majority’s selective disregard for
relevant and binding authority in order to reach what appears to be a predetermined result is
disturbing.” Id. at 824.
113. See id. at 822 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
114. Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 822 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
115. Id.
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cally held that “[t]he degree of skill and care required [of
the engineer] is dependent on his contractual obligation.”116
Given Justice Hutchinson’s interpretation of Ferentchak, she believed that
the majority’s ruling did not follow applicable precedent.117 The justice felt
that to impose a duty on the defendants to design an improved median was
“to impose an obligation not provided in the contract,” which directly violated the Ferentchak precedent.118
The majority also found support for its holding from the Billman decision.119 In Billman, like Thompson, a car drove over the median and crashed
into another badly injuring the passenger.120 The Thompson court reasoned
that, like the Thompson engineer, the Billman contractor completed all of
his expressly described contractual obligations, and the court still relied on
an expert’s opinion “to conclude that there was at least a material question
of fact as to whether the defendant contractor had breached a duty.”121
Therefore, the majority believed the Billman holding was on point and it
could apply the Billman reasoning to Thompson.122 The defendants, however, claimed that the comparison was flawed because one involved a contractor following plans under a negligent construction cause of action and the
other an engineer creating designs under a negligent design claim; the majority dismissed these differences as inconsequential.123
The dissent, on the other hand, found the majority’s reasoning confusing with respect to Billman.124 According to Justice Hutchinson, “our supreme court has repeatedly . . . found this distinction to be significant.”125
The dissent referenced the Ferentchak decision where the court held that
the “so obviously dangerous” Hunt rule only applied to independent contractors following plans and not engineers creating designs, as well as Marshall v. Burger King126 where the court again touched on the difference
between Hunt and Ferentchak.127 Finally, Justice Hutchinson concluded by
reiterating her determination that Billman was irrelevant because of the
116. Id. (quoting Ferentchak v. Vill. of Frankfort, 475 N.E.2d 822, 826 (Ill. 1985).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 823.
119. Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 816 (majority opinion).
120. See supra Part II.C; see also Billman v. Frenzel Constr. Co., 635 N.E.2d 435,
438 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
121. Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 816.
122. See id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 823 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting) (stating that “the irrelevancy of Billman to
the current matter is manifest.”).
125. Id.
126. Marshall v. Burger King, 856 N.E.2d 1048, 1064 (Ill. 2006).
127. Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 823 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
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engineer-independent contractor distinction and that Ferentchak was the
only controlling authority to this case.128
After the court concluded its precedential analysis, the majority held
that there was a factual question that needed to be answered and it reversed
the trial court’s ruling and remanded the case.129
B.

ANALYSIS

The Illinois Second District Appellate Court overruled the trial court’s
decision and in the process made three critical errors.130 First, the majority
ignored established practices of contract interpretation by disregarding the
intent of the contracting parties.131 Second, the majority broke with the
Ferentchak precedent by not limiting the scope of the engineers’ contractual duties to those explicitly mentioned in the contractual agreement.132
Third, the Thompson court incorrectly relied on the Billman decision by
analogizing an independent contractor’s contractual duties under a negligent construction claim with an engineer’s contractual duties under a negligent design claim.133 As a result, the Illinois Supreme Court should overturn
the Second District’s decision in Thompson.
1.

Contract Interpretation Gone Bad

To protect contracting parties’ reasonable expectations, courts have a
legal duty to effectuate the intent of the parties through contract interpretation.134 The majority in Thompson attempted to discern the intent of the
parties by analyzing two specific contractual provisions.135 First, the court
determined that the word “replacement” in the contract meant that the engineers “would submit plans to rebuild the bridge deck (and accompanying
median) exactly as it already existed.”136 Second, it determined that the
Id. Justice Hutchinson stated,
The majority attempts to distinguish this matter from the Ferentchak decision by focusing on the ‘essence’ of that case while ignoring its actual
holding, and then relies on Billman without bothering to address the distinction between a contractor who follows plans and an engineer who
creates plans, which our supreme court has repeatedly emphasized. I
cannot subscribe to such a legally and logically unsound approach.
Id. at 824.
129. Id. at 816, 819 (majority opinion).
130. See supra Part IV.A.1-2.
131. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Lenart, 874 N.E.2d 43, 58 (Ill. 2007).
132. See Ferentchak v. Vill. of Frankfort, 475 N.E.2d 822, 825 (Ill. 1985).
133. See Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 816.
134. See id. at 813; Gallagher, 874 N.E.2d at 58.
135. Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 813-14.
136. Id. at 815 (emphasis added).
128.

2012]

PROTECT DESIGN PROFESSIONALS

111

standard of care provision meant that the defendants would employ a “professional duty of care on defendants’ work” when designing the median. 137
Under this second provision, the court interpreted the standard of care to
create a completely separate duty of care on defendants’ work, which included an obligation to investigate and design an improved median barrier.138 As a result, the majority, in effect, determined that the engineers had a
duty to design an exact replacement as well as a simultaneous duty to design an improved median barrier.139
Unfortunately for the contracting parties, the majority did not take into
consideration that its interpretation is actually inconceivable, as these two
competing duties are in direct conflict with one another.140 Under the majority’s reasoning, if the engineers were to perform either one of these required
duties, they would physically be unable to perform the other, and thus,
would violate a contractual duty.141 For example, had the defendants created
an improved median instead of the replacement as described in the contract,
the developer could have sued the engineers for breach of contract.142 Furthermore, the Illinois Supreme Court has found that the court’s main goal
when interpreting a contract is to effectuate the intent of the parties. 143
However, this overriding principle is at odds with the majority’s finding as
it is unlikely that the parties intended to create conflicting and unworkable
duties of care in their contract.144
In addition to looking at the plain meaning of the terms of the contract,
a court has the ability to look to the conduct of the parties as evidence of the
parties’ intent.145 When looking at the conduct of the parties in this case,
both the engineers and the developer acted in accordance with only one
interpretation: replacing the median “exactly as it already existed.”146 As
the dissent aptly pointed out, if the developer had wanted a “Jersey barrier,”
he would have negotiated for an “improved” median, and not requested a
“replacement;”147 and if the engineers had not performed their task within
the proper standard of care, the developer would have had them redo the
plans in accordance with the terms of the contract.148 There was no indication in the record that the engineers had to redo any of the contracted ser137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Id.
See id.
See Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 813-14.
See id.
See id.
Gallagher v. Lenart, 874 N.E.2d 43, 58 (Ill. 2007).
See Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 811.
See supra note 16; see also Gillett v. Teel, 111 N.E.722 (Ill. 1916).
Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 814, 825 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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vices with respect to the median,149 and the majority made no reference to
either of the parties disputing the engineers’ work.150 Therefore, when looking at the conduct of the parties as evidence of intent, both parties intended
to design an exact replacement, and not an improved median.151
Had the court simply determined that the word “replacement” meant
“improvement,” and not, “exactly as it already existed,” then an improved
median barrier would have been an acceptable interpretation.152 Instead, as
the dissent stated, “the majority disregards its own interpretation of the contractual tasks to be performed by defendants and holds that defendants also
had an obligation to perform the task of redesigning the bridge deck and
median to include a Jersey barrier.”153 Because the court interpreted the
contract as having two completely opposite and conflicting duties, the majority’s interpretation failed its purpose of determining the intent of the parties.154
Since the evidence of the intent of the parties strongly points to the
dissent’s interpretation, Justice Hutchinson on many occasions suggested
that the majority was reaching a “predetermined result.”155 It is well settled
that judges may not “interpret the agreement as meaning something different from what the parties intended as expressed by the language they saw fit
to employ.”156 Moreover, “‘[j]udges have no roving writ to construe the
contract language in the way that they think best.’”157 When looking at the
Thompson opinion, it is not clear whether the majority deliberately disregarded the intent of the parties as the dissent suggests, however, it certainly
is arguable that the majority’s contract interpretation did not come to the
proper ruling.158
2.

The Ferentchak Precedent and the Scope of Design Professionals’
Contractual Duties

The second critical error that the Second District made was that it misinterpreted the “essence” of the Ferentchak decision and subsequently ap149. See Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 821 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
150. See id. at 810-19 (majority opinion); see id. at 825-27 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
151. See Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 821 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
152. See Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 814 (majority opinion).
153. Id. at 820 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
154. See id. at 814 (majority opinion); see also Gallagher v. Lenart, 874 N.E.2d 43,
58 (Ill. 2007).
155. See Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 820-21 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
156. 17A Am. Jur. 2D Contracts § 333 (2010).
157. 11 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 15, § 31:5 (quoting Exxon Co. v. Esso
Workers’ Union, Inc., 118 F.3d 841, 845 (1st Cir. 1997)).
158. See Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 820-21 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
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plied a flawed reasoning to the Thompson holding.159 The majority stated
that the “essence” of the Ferentchak decision was “that the engineer . . . had
no knowledge about the defective design and no involvement in creating
it,” and therefore, no duty was imposed.160 However, as the dissenting justice appropriately noted, “the Ferentchak court did not restrict its holding to
provide that an engineer’s duty is dependent on his contractual obligations
only when he lacks adequate information to perform an extra-contractual
task.”161 Rather the “essence” of the Ferentchak holding was that the scope
of an engineer’s duty is limited to what is specifically contained in the contract.162 The majority simply disregarded the fact that the Ferentchak court
merely mentioned that the Ferentchak engineer lacked information about
the defective design and lacked involvement in creating it as support for its
conclusion.163
After improperly interpreting the Ferentchak precedent, the majority
attempted to distinguish the Illinois Supreme Court’s ruling from Thompson.164 Applying its interpretation of Ferentchak, the Thompson majority
determined that because the engineers in Thompson had knowledge of the
allegedly defective median design and were involved in creating it, the defendants owed a duty of care to the plaintiff.165 However, the scope of an
engineer’s legal obligation in a given task has to be defined by the bargained-for contractual agreement.166 The court’s reasoning fails to take notice of the fact that neither of the engineers in the Ferentchak case nor in
Thompson actually bargained for or contracted to perform the plaintiffs’
alleged responsibilities.167 If the parties in Thompson did bargain for an
improved median, they would have included this obligation in their agreement, and would not have built a replacement median barrier.168
Furthermore, the Ferentchak contract did not explicitly mention a duty
of care to set the foundation levels, and the lack of an explicit contractual
obligation was the reason why the court determined that no duty existed. 169
Like Ferentchak, the Thompson contract did not explicitly mention a duty
to investigate and design an improved median, and similarly no such duty
159. See id. at 816-18 (majority opinion).
160. Id. at 817.
161. Id. at 822 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
162. See Ferentchak v. Vill. of Frankfort, 475 N.E.2d 822, 817 (Ill. 1985).
163. See Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 816-18 (majority opinion).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See Ferentchak, 475 N.E.2d at 826; Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 822 (Hutchinson,
J., dissenting).
167. Ferentchak, 475 N.E.2d at 826; Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 822 (Hutchinson, J.,
dissenting).
168. See Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 816-18 (majority opinion).
169. See id. at 823-26 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).

114

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 3

should have been imposed on the engineers.170 Indeed, there was an explicit
duty of care in the Thompson contract, but that entailed replacing the median “exactly as it once was,” per the majority’s interpretation.171 Finally,
because the majority imposed a duty on the defendants that was outside the
explicit contractual obligations, the court therefore broke with the Illinois
Supreme Court’s Ferentchak precedent.172
Besides breaking with the Ferentchak precedent, when looking at cases from around the country, the majority’s “no knowledge about the defective design and no involvement in creating it” reasoning is unsupported.173
Courts have followed the same reasoning as the Ferentchak court and the
Thompson dissent by looking to the contractual terms to determine the existence and scope of a given duty of care.174 In one Missouri case, a designer was sued for not supplying a hospital with certain window features that
would have made it less likely for a psychiatric patient to commit suicide.175
However, because these improved features were not asked for, and not included in the contract, the court found that there was no duty to include
these improved features.176
In another case from New York, a design professional was sued for
improperly designing an apartment complex walkway where the plaintiff
slipped on ice and was injured.177 The court found that, because this certain
design was not specified, no duty and no liability were found.178 In another
case from Texas, a design professional was sued for failing to properly design a platform in a factory where a worker fell from a ladder and was injured.179 The court found that because the design professional did not contract to anticipate the negligence of others in the factory, no duty of care
was owed to the plaintiff.180 In all of the previous cases the design professionals were somehow involved in the injury causing object, however, no
duty was found because the possible injury preventing features or improvements were not asked for or included in the contract.181 Like Justice
170. See id. at 811 (majority opinion).
171. Id. at 813-14.
172. See id. at 822 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting); Ferentchak, 475 N.E.2d at 826.
173. See, e.g., DWIGHT G. CONGER ET AL., CONSTRUCTION ACCIDENT LITIGATION §
2.7 (2nd ed. 2010).
174. See id.
175. Honey v. Barnes Hosp., 708 S.W.2d 686, 704 (Mo. App. Ct. 1986).
176. Id.
177. Lewis v. I.K.E. Realty Assoc., 439 N.Y.S.2d 447 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).
178. Id.
179. See Hanselka v. Lummus Crest, Inc., 800 S.W.2d 665, 667 (Tex. App. Ct.
1990).
180. See id.
181. See Honey v. Barnes Hosp., 708 S.W.2d 686, 704 (Mo. App. Ct. 1986); see also
Lewis, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 447; Hanselka, 800 S.W.2d at 667.
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Hutchinson reasoned in her dissent, and like the Ferentchak court held, the
key in determining the existence of a contractual duty is whether a given
duty was contractually bargained for, not whether a party has knowledge of
a possible defective design or some limited involvement in a certain project.182
3.

Design Professional vs. Independent Contractor

In addition to distinguishing Ferentchak, the majority attempted to
find support for its holding by analogizing a case from the First District,
Billman v. Frenzel Construction Co.183 In Billman, there was an accident
similar to that in Thompson where a car drove over the median barrier killing a passenger in another car, and consequently, the independent contractor who constructed the median barrier was sued for negligent construction.184 The Thompson majority reasoned that the Billman contractor, like
the Thompson engineer, completed all of his expressly described contractual obligations, and the Billman court still relied upon an expert’s opinion
“to conclude that there was at least a material question of fact as to whether
the defendant contractor had breached a duty.”185 Therefore, the Thompson
majority determined that, like Billman, it could also rely on an expert’s
opinion to determine whether the engineers breached some duty of care,
even though the engineers had completed all of their expressly described
contractual duties.186
The problem with this comparison is that Billman involves a contractor following plans, whereas Thompson involves an engineer creating designs.187 The majority in Thompson disregarded this distinction and found
that “these differences do nothing to undermine the applicability of
Billman’s basic holding to this case.”188 Although the majority has found
similarities between the Billman independent contractor and the Thompson
engineers, the Illinois Supreme Court approaches the two very differently.189
On two occasions, the Illinois Supreme Court has noted that there is a
difference between a contractor following plans under a negligent construc182. See Thompson v. Gordon, 923 N.E.2d 808, 822 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009)
(Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 816.
184. See supra Part II.C.
185. Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 816.
186. See id.
187. See Billman v. Frenzel Constr. Co., 635 N.E.2d 435, 438 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994);
see also Ferentchak v. Vill. of Frankfort, 475 N.E.2d 822, 825 (Ill. 1985).
188. Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 816.
189. See Hunt v. Blasius, 384 N.E.2d 368, 371 (Ill. 1978); see also Ferentchak, 475
N.E.2d at 825; Marshall v. Burger King, 856 N.E.2d 1048, 1055 (Ill. 2006).
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tion claim and an engineer creating designs under a negligent design
claim.190 First, in Ferentchak, the court addressed the same argument that
the Thompson majority made when it attempted to use the “so obviously
dangerous” rule from Hunt and apply it to the engineers.191 The Ferentchak
court opined that the rules for an independent contractor following designs
and an engineer creating them do not coincide.192 Second, in Marshall v.
Burger King, the court more recently reaffirmed its distinction between an
engineer and an independent contractor by referencing its prior opinion in
Ferentchak.193 Because the Illinois Supreme Court has on multiple occasions expressed its opinion that there are separate precedential tracks that
exist for engineers and independent contractors, Thompson is unsupported
by Billman.194

V.

PRACTICAL IMPACTS AND POLICY CONCERNS

The Thompson court determined that the engineers owed a duty of care
to the plaintiff to investigate and design an improved median barrier even
though this duty was not explicitly mentioned in the contract.195 As a result,
the court disregarded the intent of the parties through its contract interpretation, and it disregarded the Ferentchak precedent by imposing an
unbargained-for extra-contractual obligation on the engineers.196 The
Thompson ruling will have immediate as well as possible long term negative effects on design professionals and contracting parties in general.197
The immediate effect of the court’s decision is that the engineers who
built the replacement median barrier, which both contracting parties originally agreed upon, now, nearly twenty years later, owe a duty of care to a
third party for an additional unbargained-for task.198 The engineers were not
compensated for the extra cost or liability risk generally associated with
performing the additional task.199 Yet, they could very likely be liable for
breaching a duty of care for not completing the additional task of investigating and designing an improved median barrier when on remand.200

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Marshall, 856 N.E.2d at 1055; Ferentchak, 475 N.E.2d at 825.
Marshall, 856 N.E.2d at 1055; Ferentchak, 475 N.E.2d at 825.
Ferentchak, 475 N.E.2d at 825.
See Marshall, 856 N.E.2d at 1055.
See id.; Ferentchak, 475 N.E.2d at 825.
Thompson v. Gordon, 923 N.E.2d 808, 815 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
See id. at 813-17.
See id. at 824-25 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
See id. at 813-15 (majority opinion).
Id. at 813-15.
Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 813-15 (majority opinion).
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If left unchecked, there is the possibility for additional fallout from the
Thompson decision that could impact more than just the named parties.201
The court has set a dangerous precedent by allowing judicial contract interpretation to be a much more fluid and subjective process than originally
intended.202 The majority created an unworkable interpretation by not
properly analyzing the “plain and ordinary meaning” of the contractual
terms and by not attempting to discern the actual intent of the parties. 203
Future Illinois courts could cite Thompson as authority to create conflicting
contractual duties as a means of disregarding the contractual provisions and
intent of the parties under the guise of contract interpretation.204 Moreover,
by not limiting the scope of engineers’ contractual duties, the Thompson
court has also contradicted and confused the Ferentchak Rule which limited
the scope of contractual duties to those explicitly contained in the contract.205 Future Illinois courts could use Thompson as a springboard to further broaden the scope of contractual duties and increase the liability of
design professionals and possibly contracting parties in general.206
Beyond Thompson’s improper contract interpretation and breaking
with precedent, the court’s ruling could have a chilling effect on contracting
parties in the future.207 If design professionals believe that their bargainedfor explicit contractual terms can easily be re-written by a court at some
point in the future, it is very possible that parties would be reluctant to enter
into contractual relationships altogether.208 The ripple effect of possibly
fewer design professionals entering into contractual relationships could
result in fewer construction projects and higher prices for these types of
services.
With respect to the engineers’ court expanded median barrier duties,
the Thompson majority essentially rewrote the defendants’ contractual
agreement nearly twenty years after its inception.209 When a court decides
to fundamentally change the parties’ contractual agreement, it is not only
wrong from a legal standpoint, it is also unfair to the contracting parties.210
The main reason why parties enter into contractual relationships in the first
place is “to project exchange into the future and to tailor their affairs ac201. Id. at 824-25 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
202. See Gallagher v. Lenart, 874 N.E.2d 43, 58 (Ill. 2007).
203. See id.; Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 813-15 (majority opinion).
204. 17A AM . JUR . 2D Contracts § 1 (2010).
205. See Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 816-18; see also Ferentchak v. Vill. of Frankfort,
475 N.E.2d 822, 825-26 (Ill. 1985).
206. See Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 824-25 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
207. Id.
208. See 11 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 15 and accompanying text.
209. See Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 824-25 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
210. See 11 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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cording to their individual needs and interests.”211 Because parties contract
to prepare for future risk and costs associated with contractual obligations,
when a court takes away parties’ valid expectations, it is both unfair and
against public policy.212

VI.

CONCLUSION

The Thompson court erred in its ruling because it ignored established
practices of contract interpretation by disregarding the true intent of the
contracting parties.213 The majority found that the defendants owed a duty
of care to replace the median “exactly as it once was.”214 It then found a
conflicting duty in the standard of care provision to investigate and design
an improved median barrier.215 These two duties are unworkable as it is
impossible for them both to be performed.216 The parties did not intend to
create unworkable duties, instead, their intent was to design an exact replacement, and the parties’ conduct has confirmed their intent.217 Therefore,
the majority has ignored the true intent of the parties and thus improperly
interpreted the terms of their contractual agreement.218
The Thompson majority also erred because the court imposed a duty of
care on the defendants that was outside the explicit contractual obligations.219 The contract was devoid of an explicit duty of care to investigate
and design an improved median barrier.220 In fact, the only explicitly mentioned duty of care was to design a replacement median barrier “exactly as
it once was,” per the majority’s interpretation.221 To support its finding the
majority attempted to distinguish the Ferentchak decision, except it misinterpreted the actual holding of the case.222 The Ferentchak court held that
the scope of an engineer’s contractual duty of care is limited by the explicit
contractual obligations.223 As a result of imposing an extra-contractual duty
of care, the Thompson majority broke with the Illinois Supreme Court’s

211. 1 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1:1 (4th ed. 2010) (citing
MCA Television Ltd. V. Pub. Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 1999)).
212. 17A AM . JUR . 2D Contracts § 1 (2010).
213. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Lenart, 874 N.E.2d 43, 58 (Ill. 2007).
214. See supra Part IV.B.
215. Thompson v. Gordon, 923 N.E.2d 808, 813-15 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
216. See supra Part IV.B.
217. Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 821 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
218. See supra Part IV.B.
219. See supra Part IV.B.
220. Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 811.
221. Id. at 813-15.
222. See supra Part IV.B.
223. See Ferentchak v. Vill. of Frankfort, 475 N.E.2d 822, 825-26 (Ill. 1985).
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Ferentchak precedent by not limiting the scope of the engineers’ duties to
the explicit contractual obligations.224
The Thompson court also incorrectly relied on the Billman holding to
bolster its finding.225 The majority attempted to analogize an independent
contractor’s duties under a negligent construction claim with an engineer’s
contractual duties under a negligent design claim.226 The Illinois Supreme
Court has on multiple occasions expressed its opinion that there are separate and distinct precedential tracks that exist for engineers and independent
contractors, and therefore, Thompson is unsupported by Billman.227
Beyond the court’s improper contract interpretation and failure to follow applicable precedent, the decision has immediate and long term negative consequences.228 The court has imposed unbargained-for duties on the
engineers, twenty years after the parties signed the contract.229 The practical
effect is that there could be a chilling effect regarding future contractual
relationships.230 If parties fear their contracts will be re-written by courts
years later, it is very possible that parties will be reluctant to enter into contractual relationships altogether.231
Because the Thompson decision improperly interpreted the parties’
contract, failed to follow applicable precedent, and because negative practical implications are inevitable, the Illinois Supreme Court should, therefore,
overrule the Second District’s grant of summary judgment for the plaintiff
and reaffirm its Ferentchak precedent.
DANIEL NUNNEY

224. Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 822-23 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
225. See supra Part IV.B.
226. See Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 816.
227. See Ferentchak, 475 N.E.2d at 825; see also Marshall v. Burger King, 856
N.E.2d 1048, 1055 (Ill. 2006).
228. See supra Part V.
229. Thompson, 923 N.E.2d at 811-12.
230. Id. at 824-25 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
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